This is a point of contention for the U.S. in its relationship with Europe.  The U.S. wants European NATO to shoulder more of the alliance burden since reliance on U.S. largesse has meant the E.U. having spare resources to throw into self-harming monolithist programs like climate change and other unproductive U.N. initiatives. Picking up on the geopolitical dimensions earlier in the military positioning in the Indo-Pacific, Australia is dealing with the PRC as a regional hegemon that is on its way to rivalling the USN, at least in quantitative terms, in the Southwest Pacific.  While the PRC economy has hit a structural roadblock requiring it to slow down to deal with serious internal issues, its momentum in military spending is expected to continue given the CCP’s capacity to ignore social welfare in the short term to focus on external positioning.  China’s current national strategy is expected to propel the country towards exceeding defence spending by NATO excluding the U.S. (USD350 billion in 2024).  This is the context that Australia is operating in. Besides China, Australia must also contend with the arms race in Asia brought about by Beijing.  While most of the countries along the continental Asian seaboard are friendly to Australia, the fast-rising regional defence expenditures have added a layer of complexity to Australia’s ability to retain a competitive edge and presence in the Southwest Pacific.

With our significant energy resources in the Northwest, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has identified the northern approaches as the strategically most significant territory for national defence.  But beyond the LNG reserves up north, even more alluring potentials beckon the PLAN further south.  There is nothing surer than China will be increasing the tempo of Southwest Pacific excursions with the aim of staking a territorial claim on the Antarctic landmass.

Australia has a 42% (5.9 million km2) portion of the landmass, with six other countries holding territorial claims in Antarctica – Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the U.K.  Some of these claims overlap, particularly in the Antarctic Peninsula region.  The Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1959 by many countries including those with and without territorial stakes, put these claims on hold, preventing any new claims or expansion of existing ones.  There is also a portion of Antarctica, known as Marie Byrd Land, that has no formal claim.  In 1983, China ratified the Antarctic Treaty, which contains Article IV stating that “no new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force”.  In return, China gained consultative party status with voting rights in 1985.  The Treaty’s Article XII requires unanimous agreement of all 7 claimants, including Australia, to the Treaty to amend Article IV.  In addition, led by Australia, the Madrid Protocol was enacted in 1991 and entered into force in 1998, prohibiting any activity relating to mineral resources other than scientific research. This mining ban was endorsed by China but for how long nobody knows.  In 2017, China reiterated its support for the Antarctic Treaty and Madrid Protocol while hosting the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting for the first time.  However, in the context of CCP operation with regard international treaties, these are diplomatic decorations until Beijing decides them to be no longer valid.  The history of conduct by China with regard international laws and protocols that the country has signed up to has not been stellar.  Australia needs to take dealing with Beijing at face value that the CCP has presented to the world.  Article 25 of the Antarctic Treaty provides for review of the Madrid Protocol in 2049 and there is no doubt Beijing will challenge then if not much sooner as it sees fit.  Since its first Antarctic expedition in 1983, China has built 5 Antarctic stations, with the 5th completed in 2024.  It has two ice-breakers allocated to the region.  The country’s apparent interest in Antarctic krill fishery has caused a stalemate of the process to establish marine protected areas in Antarctica.  There was hope in diplomatic circles that if Antarctic states could induce China to express categorically that it had no design on Antarctic territory, then that issue could be put to bed. The Treaty’s Article VII allows each claimant to inspect the Antarctic stations of other parties. Australia can request inspection of the Chinese stations but it is unlikely that China will acquiesce or Australia will demand such inspection should China refuse.  China reaffirmed its adherence to international laws regarding the Arctic in its 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper, which raised hope of improved bilateral relations with the Nordic states.  This move was aimed at convincing E.U. members to participate in the BRI.  But this hasn’t materialised so China is pursuing an expansive Arctic exploration program.  It has declared itself a near-Arctic country.

Beijing has lodged application with Australia to establish a 6th base in Antarctica.  Members to the Antarctic Treaty cannot veto an application for a scientific exploration station.  The application places the proposed new base in the unclaimed territory portion, the other side of the gulf facing Qinling Station.  The new station will have a 900sqm building and 500sqm laboratory, designed to house 25 staff.  China is expected to use the Antarctic bases for dual purposes including military surveillance.  Canberra has a responsibility to prioritise this growing challenge.  Our current RAN budget and capabilities fall far short of being able to provide deterrence to the PLAN in this region.   Australia should lead a comprehensive review of the Antarctic Treaty to clarify its management of the AAT from an environmental and national security perspective.  The time has come for fortifying control and supervision of the AAT.  A strong deterrence policy is best at this stage, as any military occupation would encounter significant difficulties but so would dealing with such occupation after the fact.

Deterrence

Strategic deterrence has proved its worth throughout history.  Weakness invites aggression as seen in the 2014 annexation of the Crimea and 2022 invasion of Ukraine.  The CCP’s attempt at annexing the SEAS and East China Sea added to the adage of Peace Through Strength.  A prejudged high price for invasion is the best prevention of kinetic warfare.  Sometimes the high price is seen only after the die has been cast, which is dangerous because by that time the aggressor becomes even more furious and desperate to take the war further as pulling back is not an option.  The Ukraine war is a case at hand.  The CCP must believe that Australia is far stronger than at first sight, and this strength comes from both sovereign capabilities and as part of the Western network, meaning U.S. alliance.  Australia must reconfirm and build the enablers for:

• The choice of free market open society

• The military power balance that will protect this choice

• Economic conditions that will underwrite the military position

• Better economic conditions that will mitigate socio-political radicalism to give us a better society.

Within this framework, scenario playing can be engaged in to provide strategic and tactical positioning of Australia.  From a rational standpoint, Beijing should not be contemplating going rogue in the Indo-Pacific given the risks discussed.  On the other hand, the CCP might take a punt given its entrenched monolithic nature.  It may well be that Beijing sees the First and Second Island Chains as a recent historical monstrosity that the country needs to slay to fulfill its ambition of regional or global domination.  As mentioned, apologists for the CCP’s view of history and its conduct, and of China’s destiny in the world, have rolled out the following:

• China’s nature has not been territorially expansionary

• China’s regional dominance some time back in history makes it legitimate for the country to reclaim such title

• China’s current economic ranking and performance warrant its place in the world as co-leader with the West.

The first view is wrong as already shown.  The second is irrelevant.  The third has been offered to China multiple times over 20-30 years but failed because of China’s monolithic ideology of supremacy, not co-existence.  China’s diplomatic conduct with neighbours, the West and at the U.N. shows that it sees itself as the one and only true emperor, the ultimate central commander.  This is the only reason why it has spent decades planning and labouring towards Made in China 2015 for the express purpose of monopolising all the key industries and markets in the world; and building at breakneck pace a military that can rival the U.S. even though its GDP per capita is one-third of Taiwan’s.  This rush to winner-takes-all position is a loud echo of the past, the time of feudal, colonial and fascist empires ruling the globe, coupled with territorial conquest and absolute disregard for others’ interests.  The vast commercial fishing fleets that plunder other nations’ seas with no sense of legal or governmental restraint is symbol to an amoral regime.  It is nigh on impossible to use diplomacy with the CCP and hope for mutual consideration.

Australia’s job is to convince the CCP leadership that unilateral military action on Taiwan would certainly drive middle-power nations like Australia to coalesce around the U.S. without qualification.  Beijing’s calculus might have been that a Western military alliance would be difficult for Australia given the top customer position China holds in Australia’s trade, something that Beijing had felt confident about previously to give Canberra a dressing down with cancellation of coal and lobster imports from Australia.  Beijing should understand under no uncertain terms that an attack on Taiwan would bring about hell on earth for China’s coastal region, with the outcome that China would be pushed back, exposing the legitimacy of the CCP with the Chinese public.  By the same token, the CCP needs to accept that in any major conflict besides Taiwan, if such has the potential to harm the West materially, that the West would return the same response.  Japan’s PM Sanae Takaichi has confirmed her predecessor’s warning that a China move on Taiwan would pull in Japan, so Australia can just confirm her confirmation.

The challenge for the West is to keep the Chinese people somehow on side if at all possible.  The rewriting of history by the CCP and strict indoctrination environment at home that is protected by a digital curtain make it hard for the public to disavow CCP policies.  Despite misgivings of authoritarian rules, the public is forever reminded by the propaganda machine to be grateful to the CCP, which is claimed to have pulled China from a backwater situation to the world’s pre-eminent economy.  Most Chinese only see the CCP being bullied by the U.S. in state-backed media, while the true history of U.S. sponsorship of China’s rise cannot be told due to non-existence of a free press.  Even for the educated public on the east coast, the CCP has succeeded to a large degree in meshing its power and governance records with Chinese nationalism and economic miracle.  There is a sense that what the CCP has done has been commendable in the big picture, that it has made China an economic powerhouse by hook or by crook.  This is aided by expression of admiration in the West for the CCP’s single-mindedness, determination and strategic smart in taking advantage of the international trading system set up by the West to beat the West.  Every charlatan invokes past wrongs to galvanise others to accept the monolithic direction for redress.  It’s not difficult to turn people into self-perceived victims.  Frustration, anger or hatred toward the West justifies and consolidates the CCP’s power in the mind of the people.  The light in this tunnel for the two-thirds of the Chinese people that haven’t participated directly in the coastal economy is today’s communication technology that helps keep connecting peoples from around the globe to see each other’s perspectives.  For the third that live and work or supply along the coastal cities and provinces and some fast-developing inner regions, regular business contact with the outside world maintains a modicum of open-mindedness.  The humble VPN has been doing its bit to help many Chinese keep an even keel in terms of getting news from outside China, a world effectively blocked by the digital curtain.

There have been recent purges of military commanders in China that may be bad news or good news.  But any change of power at the top will not be sufficient to reset Beijing’s thought processes to come to terms with, for instance, Taiwan being a sovereign country.  This issue is the elephant in the room that all parties to the Indo-Pacific pretend they don’t see.  Whoever takes power in China, it is highly likely that the CCP will remain and nothing fundamental will change.  Australia will need to remain strong in all respects to protect its sovereignty, freedom and prosperity through a strong U.S. led Western alliance.  As a middle power, Australia has been able to punch above its weight diplomatically thanks to its democratic traditions, Christian principles, secular governance, free market economy, and membership of a West-centric world economy and military alliance.  We should continue to work on:

• Acknowledging and consolidating the civilisational advantage in the synthesis of the evolving values of free enterprise that has been distilled and tested through thousands of years of dialectical development around the world.

• Aligning with the U.S. to reset the global political economic system based on the humanist win-win principle embedded in free market capitalism and transparent open society.

• Engaging deeply in economic reform to lower our economy’s cost structure in genuine account of the changing geopolitical landscape – by cutting the excess size of government and redirect its priorities to leadership and away from bribery disbursement

• Freeing up our industries from fiscal intervention and regulatory intrusion so that private enterprises can flourish again to raise productivity to barrack Australia’s position in the new world order

• Focusing on core government responsibilities to do a better job, particularly in stewardship of the environment, jurisprudence and judicial system, defence and law and order.

The necessary government roles:

• Defence of the nation

• Keeping domestic law and order

• Protection of private property rights

• Adjudication of dispute amongst citizens

• Procurement of public and infrastructure goods, including establishment of the regulatory framework in which competing private suppliers of goods and services operate

• Rigorous maintenance of the competitiveness and contestability of domestic industries and markets.

Embedded in these roles is the setting of strategic direction for the country and pulling the public along.  This role requires government to not be market participant or shareholder of enterprises to avoid conflicts of interests.  Government provision of public goods sometimes requires it to call for tenders to supply those goods.  The last two items above refer to procurement, not production, of goods and services.  The government should have no business in such production.  It may call for goods and services provision but leaves their production and delivery to the free competitive market that it protects.

Australia’s defence budget has been set to increase slowly to 2030.  Since global defence budgets (and defence items) are costed mainly in USD, looking at Australia’s military budget from this angle reflects more accurately Australia’s state of vulnerability relative to other countries.  The projected budget is not sufficient to position the country to face the multilateral threats ahead.

The federal budget shows defence spending rising significantly over the next decade under the new National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Plan.  It shows that defence is due to receive a total of $718 billion over the 10 years to 2032-33, up 11% from the $647 billion envisaged in the 2022 Pre-Election Fiscal Outlook prepared by the Treasury.  The increase in funding starts slowly but gets larger over the decade, so that by 2032-33, defence is projected to have $96.5 billion to spend, which is 17.1% more than was provided for the same year in 2022.  The FY2025 budget, which was handed down shortly after the Defence Strategic Review called for a sweeping overhaul of Australia’s military capabilities, was criticised for providing no additional funding over the four-year budget period, other than compensation for a fall in the value of the AUD.  With no compensation for inflation, which was then running at 6%, defence was falling behind.

The only increase in FY2024 came beyond the four-year budget period, with a provision for an additional $30 billion from 2027-28 and beyond.  The first of that spending is now within the budget horizon.  The budget provides $67.4 billion for defence in FY2028, a 10.6% rise on FY2027.  The budget also incorporates an additional $1.7 billion for shipbuilding over the four-year budget period, which is part of the government’s $11.1 billion response to a review of the navy’s surface fleet, announced in February.  The cost of implementing the National Defence Strategy and its associated spending plan, the Integrated Investment Program, over the budget period is an additional $5.7 billion, rising to $50.3 billion over the decade.

Over the next 10 years, defence spending will average an annual increase of 6.6%, delivering a real increase ahead of inflation.  Treasury predicts consumer-price inflation will fall to 2.75% this year and next and then average 2.5% beyond that, which may be optimistic unless it can deregulate industries and coax the private sector into raising supply materially while cutting government demand.  The government faces a series of other spending pressures, with the cost of the National Disability Insurance Scheme forecast to keep rising at an average 9.2% a year over the decade and absorbing more than defence.  This should not be accepted at face value.  The NDIS has room to be trimmed by at last one-third if the government focuses on people in real need, not on the pumped-up associated resources.  Interest costs are predicted to rise by an annual average of 9.9% over the decade, while aged care, hospitals and Medicare all face costs rising at average rates of between 5.7% and 6.5%.  For the rest of this decade, the defence share of the federal budget will rise only marginally from 6.1% to 6.3% percent.  However, other key arms of government are receiving smaller shares.  Education’s share of the budget will fall from 7.1% to 6.8%, while the health share eases from 15.5% 14.8%.  This begs the questions 1) where is the money going, and 2) what will happen if we drop the non-critical areas of Net-Zero and other market distorting programs such as industry and consumer product subsidies?

As indicated in the release of the National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Plan, the increase in government funding goes only part of the way to covering the cost of the major planned investments.  The $50.3 billion in additional budget funding over the decade hardly covers the cost of the submarines, which the investment plan said would be greater than $50 billion over the decade.  The budget funding will have to be supplemented by a further $73 billion in cuts to existing programs to fund the $330 billion total investment in new equipment over the decade.  Cuts include the reduction in the number of infantry fighting vehicles and cancelling the purchases of a fourth squadron of F-35A fighters and two joint support ships.  These cuts should be avoided by raising defence spending to >4% of GDP in the next five years.

Total defence spending is expected in the budget to rise to 2.3% of GDP by 2033-34, up from 2.1% this year.  The government had flagged that spending would reach 2.4%, however an upgrade in Treasury’s forecast for nominal GDP means that the percentage will now be slightly less.  There has been little change in the AUD’s exchange rate since the mid-year budget update in Dec 2024 so the budget does not include any of the compensation that inflated last year’s defence resourcing.  The AUD fell over the latter half of 2023, which meant there was an additional $2.5 billion provided by the Finance Department to offset the additional cost of equipment purchased abroad, but this was included in the 2023-24 additional estimate statement.

Australia’s Forces

War today is total, not just kinetics mixed with psychology, diplomacy, industrial production, espionage and propaganda.  War can now be decided on AI based cyber-attack and immobilisation of a nation’s entire infrastructure or operation.  A country must ensure domestic capacity in core military asset manufacturing and robust, sovereign power supply infrastructure. This requires steep economic reform to bring that capacity to par with international efficiency and recast of the energy supply sector as gone through in this book.  Moreover, we should be clear about what we are defending to formulate strategy and prioritise defence asset acquisition.  Prof. Hugh White’s book How to Defend Australia (2019) gives a strong review of past key government reports and White Papers on the topic.  The 1986 Dibb Report confirmed Australia’s Strategy of Denial that had always been the mainstay of strategic defence, and still is, that is to fight at sea (and in the air in modern time) and deny adversaries’ access to nearby ports for staging launches on the Australian continent.  The British Empire did that during settlement time and World War 2 showed how Imperial Japan could reach Darwin by creating a military access chain along East and South-East Asia all the way to the access points in Indonesia.

There is no surprise in Prof. White’s view that Australia should look at an independent capacity for territorial self-defence and not place all our eggs in the American alliance basket, as the first in a concentric order of four priorities.  The second is being able to look after our immediate neighbourhood, Oceania, the third is being able to make material contribution to Allied efforts in maritime South-East Asia, and fourth is doing so with Allies in the larger Asia and global order.

What we would add to this strategic view is that “adversary” in today’s world must include the monolithistic forces that are attempting to dominate the Australian political economy.  We should be clear about WHAT we wish to defend, which is our free market liberal society.  This, above all, forms the Australian nation, for which 10% of the 4.5-4.9 million population (40% of males aged 18-44) enlisted in 1914, 62,000 of whom were killed and 155,000 injured, most of them away from Australian territory, which was not at risk of being invaded then.  World War 2 saw 1 million served out of 7 million population, with 40,000 killed and roughly a similar number injured.  This war was close to home but again the enemy was a monolithist force belonging to a monolithist axis.  The same can be said of the Korean War and Vietnam War, with smaller casualties, both wars also being fought against monolithist adversaries.  Thus, while previous wars were fought against external monolithist forces, Australia must be mindful of the encroachment of these ideologies within our society already in the context of defence in the next conflict.  Australians will be asked to be more discernible about what constitutes monolithistic propaganda and activism from free speech and lawful assembly.

With regard economic capacity to fund future wars, there tends to be comparison between Australia and Scandinavia, where resources rich Norway managed to put aside the Pension Fund Global that is 10 times Australia’s Future Fund in value despite having one-fifth the population; Sweden is building among the most advanced automobiles, jet fighters, warships, and white goods, while Australia has no key manufactured consumer industries to show for.  This comparison is a little unfair on Australia since Scandinavia steps outside its front door to a high-income 450 million E.U. market while Australia faces a relatively fragmented ASEAN, with the main markets being primary resources and specialised manufactures and quite some distances away (although in the same time zone).  In this context, Australia must focus on its comparative advantages in the primary industries and services sector.  To support the niche manufacturing parts of the economy, Australia must have a cheap, most reliable electricity supply system and a labour market conducive for both primary and high-class manufacturing as discussed.  Mass, low-cost manufacturing is not for Australia in the foreseeable future since we have a strong primary sector that will keep giving us the Gregory Effect.  Education and training, immigration, taxation, regulations, are among the more important factors driving the high-value manufacturing segment that will suit our sovereign and exportable defence sector and hence they must be reviewed completely.  Overall, our defence posture should be based on the three As:

• American Alliance

• Australian continent

• Australian Antarctic Territory

This AAA Defence posture should be openly pursued so that there is no confusion about strategic deterrence.  The world doesn’t allow strategic ambiguity anymore.  Military hardware and software still dominate war operations and results in the battlefield.  Maintaining existing relative peace and status quo in the Indo-Pacific means the West must prove that it has overwhelming military power to win a hot war against any of China’s aggressive moves.  The regular FONOP excursions by Allied warships in the SEAS and Taiwan Strait is a small but explicit show of force and commitment.  The multi-nation wargame exercises in the Pacific also carry their role of putting money and hardware where the mouths are.  These activities may be unnecessary sabre-rattling between democracies but are vital when trying to deter monolithic forces.

China does not yet have the naval capacity to project military power as far south as Australia.  But it does have capacity to interdict Australia’s seaborne trade to some extent, the way that it has played an irritant role in the East China Sea and SEAS.  China has been undergoing sea trials of its 3rd aircraft carrier and within several years will have fully equipped 3 carrier battle groups that include the air wings and escort ships.  At that time, China will be capable of projecting power in the Southwest Pacific the way only the U.S. can do at present.  The only limiting factor will be the fleets’ refuelling capacity that may constrain them compared to U.S. nuclear powered aircraft carriers and submarines.  This development is jeopardising Australia’s security should the U.S. falter in its effort to contain China’s military expansion for any reason.  If China circumvents Australia to land some symbolic armed forces in the Antarctic sometime in the 2030s, it would be extremely difficult for Australia or any Antarctic state to counter such a move.  Australia has only a short time frame to increase our defence capabilities to work effectively on our own and with the U.S. and the Antarctic states.

Australia will continue to rely on the U.S. Navy for China deterrence, with intensified cooperation with the Japanese, Taiwanese, South Korean and Singapore Navies.  The U.S. has recently made clear that it will defend Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific theatre.  It has shifted significant resources to Guam, Diego Garcia, Philippines and Japan in the last 10-15 years even as it was withdrawing from Afghanistan.  Regardless of tactical and at times policy movements towards Taiwan for diplomatic or trade reasons, the U.S. will not abandon the island state.  The semiconductor supply chain will ensure of that.  China’s aggression in the region has aided the U.S.’s consolidation of forward power.  DC approved sale of new generation F-16s, short range missiles and Abrams tanks to Taiwan in 2020 and signed a new Taiwan Allies and International Protection Enhancement Initiative Act, reconfirming its commitment to Taipei.  Vietnam has recently signed up to buy 26 latest F-16 Block VS Viper.  The value added that Australia could provide is the same as it did in World War 2, a vast forward logistical base for the U.S.  China might be able to do damage to Guam but Australia lies outside most of China’s long-range missiles except for the ICBMs, which will provide the U.S. and Australian missile defence nets time to intercept.

The DF-31, CSS-3, JL-2, DF-31A, and CSS-4 are all intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) developed by China.  All meet the international ICBM threshold (range >5,500 km) under international arms control standards.  China’s ICBM arsenal, including these, has grown to 350–400 missiles as of 2024 per U.S. estimates.  This represents a 20% increase on 2023.  The JL-2’s strategic role is to provide sea-based deterrence; the DF-31A emphasises mobility; the CSS-4 focuses on silo survivability and payload.  China recently tested JL-2 variants while DF-31A production continues apace.  The CSS-4 Mod 4 achieved initial operational capability in mid-2024.  The key elements of Australia’s outer defence to 2030 are:

• 72 F-35A and fleet of Loyal Wingman UAVs with possible addition of 25 F-35s

• Current stock of 6 Collins class submarines under life-extension

• 6 BAE Hunter-class anti-submarine frigates

• 11 new Mogami-class frigates that adds to the current 8 Anzac-class frigates

• 2 light (helicopter) aircraft carriers

• 3 Hobart-class destroyers and fleet of Australian patrol boats

• 7 Anzac-class frigates (RAN workhorses)

• 200 AGM-158C long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASM)

• Agreement with the U.S. to produce missiles in Australia

• Acquisition of Ghost Bat UAVs and Ghost Shark unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV).

The RAAF completed delivery of its full fleet of 72 F-35A Lightning II multirole fighters in December 2024, with the final nine arriving at RAAF Base Williamtown. These fifth-generation stealth aircraft are equipped for integration with advanced munitions like the Joint Strike Missile (JSM) and AGM-158C LRASM.  Australia needs more fighter aircraft, however, rather than ordering more F-35A we should participate in the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) or another 6th or 7th generation fighter program.  These new programs are structured to be procured in much shorter time frames than the F-35 and will complement the F-35s with air-to-air dominance.  For the provisioned additional F-35As, it would be better for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) to acquire 24-32 F-35Bs, the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) version, for the converted LHDs.

The six diesel-electric Collins-class submarines (HMAS Collins, Farncomb, Waller, Dechaineux, Sheean, and Rankin) remain in service, undergoing a Life-of-Type Extension (LOTE) program valued at $4-5 billion to extend their operational life into the 2030s.  This bridges the gap until the arrival of Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS (expected early 2030s).  As of mid-2025, availability challenges persist (eg, only one fully operational at times due to maintenance), but upgrades include modernised sonars, communications, and escape systems.  Full sustainment is managed by ASC Pty Ltd under a A$2.2 billion contract.  White believes that a new order of up to 24 updated Collins class subs, rather than nuclear powered subs, should be placed to take advantage of readily improvable design and build facilities in Australia.   

But given AUKUS’s committed and engaged status, it is imperative that Australia sticks to this program and procure the first 3 Virginia subs as soon as possible through emergency budget allowances.  This could be done by lease-purchase or however, and the total number should be raised to 12-14.  Submarines are the indispensable component of strategic and conflict deterrence in sea warfare.  They also provide significant invisible support to surface ships, which are becoming more vulnerable with the vast changes in precision missile and radar technology.  Nuclear powered submarines have range and longevity at sea that the RAN needs, besides the fact that the Virginia class is a league above other advanced submarines in use in the West.  While modern diesel-electric submarines are quiet and efficient, their weakness lies in the need for them to surface periodically to raise the snorkelling mast for air exchange, when they are vulnerable to detection.  With the nuclear subs, the trick with keeping to an accelerated timeline is for the ADF to not modify too much their specifications, something it is renowned for doing.

The original 9 Hunter-class frigates (based on BAE Systems’ Type 26 design), under Project SEA 5000, was reduced to 6 in Feb 2024 following the Surface Fleet Review to prioritise other capabilities.  Construction of the first three began at Osborne Naval Shipyard in June 2024, with the lead ship (HMAS Hunter) expected in 2032.  Again, this is too slow.  These frigates are optimised for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), will feature advanced ASW sonars (Sonar 2150), Mk 41 vertical launch systems (VLS) for up to 32 missiles (including SM-6 and Tomahawks), and the best in kind MH-60R Seahawk helicopters.  Given the large cost blow-outs in this program, the VLS number could have been 50% higher to match standards of international warships of similar unit costs. The number reduction for the Hunters also reflects a needed front-loading shift to 11 new general-purpose frigates from Japan, a $10.5 billion deal announced in Aug 2025 by Canberra for an upgraded version of the Japanese Mogami-class ship.  This is a much better bang-for-buck purchase.  Both Hunter and Mogami projects entail majority units being built in Australia.  They must be done with laser weaponry in mind.

The 132-metre state-of-the-art stealth-oriented design of the Mogami suits Australia well in its multi-role capability with speed (30 knots) and high automation, which reduces the crew size to 90, which compares well to 180 for Hunters and 200 for the (likely to be cancelled) U.S. selected Constellation class frigate for its own Navy.  Mogami also has 32 VLS cells.  The Mogami selection is geared toward providing Australia with long distance (18,500 kms range) deployment capabilities quickly (first 3 Japanese built units by 2029, followed by 8 Australian built) using ready-made Japanese radar and combat systems that have proved to work well with the American ones.

The Anzac-class fleet is in transition and declining.  The eight MEKO 200 multi-role frigates (eg, HMAS Anzac, Arunta) are a major current RAN component for ASW, air defence, and surface warfare.  However, they are ageing (commissioned 1996–2006) and undergoing the Anzac Mid-Life Capability Assurance Program (AMCAP) for upgrades like new radars and combat systems.  HMAS Anzac was decommissioned in May 2024, and HMAS Arunta is scheduled for 2026, with the rest extended to 2043 but no further major upgrades.  They will be fully replaced by the six Hunter-class ASW frigates and 11 Mogami-class general-purpose frigates by the mid-2030s.  As of September 2025, seven remain operational.

The 2 helicopter carriers are officially classified as Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs). The two Canberra-class amphibious assault ships (HMAS Canberra and Adelaide) are the RAN’s largest vessels, displacing 27,000 tonnes each.  Commissioned in 2014 and 2015, they support amphibious operations, disaster relief, and helicopter deployments (up to 18 rotary-wing aircraft, eg, MRH-90s or MH-60Rs).  They feature well decks for landing craft and ski-jump ramps (retained from the Spanish Juan Carlos I design), enabling potential STOVL operations (F-35B).  Australia can consider deploying 12-18 F-35B on each of the ships like Japan’s Izumo-class carriers, with one homeported at Garden Island in WA.

The three Hobart-class air warfare destroyers (HMAS Hobart, Brisbane, and Sydney) are Aegis-equipped guided-missile ships based on Navantia’s F100 design.  All three are operational as of 2025: Hobart (2017), Brisbane (2018), and Sydney (2020).  They provide advanced air defence with 48 Mk-41 VLS cells (for SM-2/SM-6 missiles), anti-submarine capabilities (MH-60R helicopters, towed sonar), and surface strike (NSM missiles, 127mm gun).  A $5.1 billion upgrade (SEA 4000 Phase 6) began in 2025, adding Tomahawk missiles, Baseline 9 Aegis, and Saab’s Australian Interface for enhanced interoperability. Sustainment is now under BAE Systems Australia.

The Arafura-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) are the primary border fleet, with six vessels planned (reduced from 12 in 2024) – HMAS Arafura (commissioned June 2025), NUSHIP Eyre (delivery late 2025), and four under construction at Henderson (keel laid for sixth, NUSHIP Carpentaria, in Aug 2025).  They replace Armidale-class (eight, retiring) and Cape-class (six evolved variants operational for border patrol).  Arafuras (2,000 tonnes) focus on maritime security, fisheries protection, and regional engagement, armed with 25mm guns and RHIBs.  They support un-crewed systems and humanitarian missions, with full fleet operational by 2029.  Archibald draws attention to an obvious need for RAN to acquire a fleet of 50 flying boats since an Indo-Pacific war will be foremost a maritime war.  He recommends the Grumman Albatross, which is manufactured by Amphibian Aerospace Industries in Darwin.

In Feb 2020, the U.S. approved the sale of up to 200 AGM-158C LRASMs (plus 11 inert variants) for $1.47 billion, integrated on RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornets (initially), P-8A Poseidons, and future F-35As.  A successful live-fire test from a Super Hornet occurred in Feb 2025 off California, achieving operational readiness in March 2025.  Valued at A$900 million (as of 2025), they provide stealthy, autonomous anti-ship strikes beyond 370 km, replacing Harpoons.  Additional funding supports integration, with full delivery by late 2020s.  Australia also has a new factory to produce up to 4,000 U.S. designed Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM) per year.  These have ranges of 70 kms and exceeding 500 kms, respectively.  The more we can produce precision strike short- to medium-range missiles and disposable fuel-powered drones, the less we will need troops on the ground or boats at sea.  These missiles and longer-range drones, complementing the inventory of short-range battery-operated FPV drones, are the right types for the intricate theatre of Indo-Pacific.   

Besides those components for the outer defence perimeter, the Australian Army components and other ADF-wide elements complete the broader ADF coverage.  The Army (28,000 regular personnel) emphasises mechanised infantry, armoured reconnaissance, and long-range fires under the 2023 Defence Strategic Review.  Major assets as of 2025:

• Tanks and Armoured Vehicles: 75 new M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams variant delivered in 2024-25 following a $2.5 billion order in 2022.  49 of the older M1A1 tanks, acquired by Australia in 2004 and retired starting in July 2024, are being transferred as surplus equipment to support Ukraine’s armoured brigades.  This forms part of the $1.3 billion military assistance to Ukraine since 2022.  The M1A2 SEPv3 tanks are a more advanced model with upgraded armor, sensors, and active protection systems.  10 of the older tanks are being kept for training purposes.

• 450 Boxer 8x8 Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (CRVs; Rheinmetall; deliveries ongoing to 2026 for 25 variants); 1,100 Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles (PMVs; ongoing upgrades); 257 ASLAV wheeled reconnaissance vehicles (retiring mid-2020s for Boxer replacement under LAND 400 Phase 3).

• Artillery and Rockets: 30 AS9 Huntsman 155mm self-propelled howitzers (Hanwha K9-based; first two delivered March 2025, full by 2028); 42 M142 HIMARS rocket systems (accelerated; first two March 2025, full by 2028; with GMLRS/ATACMS munitions); 54 M777 lightweight towed howitzers.

• Infantry and Small Arms: EF88 Austeyr rifles (standard issue; 37,000 under LAND 159 Lethality Systems Project); F90 grenade launchers, MAG-58 machine guns, and new pistols (Glock 17 Gen5 from 2022); 1.3 million rounds of advanced munitions.

• Aviation: 29 AH-64E Apache Guardian attack helicopters (replacing ARH Tigers from 2025; first deliveries 2026); 22 CH-47F Chinooks (heavy lift); 38 MRH-90 Taipans (multi-role; retiring early 2020s for Black Hawks).

While Prof. White thinks that the RAN complement of surface ships is unsuitable for modern warfare, he questions what the Army is getting into.  If Sea Denial is the strategy for the ADF, there is not much point maintaining a large Army unless it is designed to raise the stake for an adversary by forcing it to send a large amphibious force, which will make it better targets for Australian submarines.  He can see there may be a case for “ two armies”, one for baiting the enemy and the other for real defence of the continent.  The baiting half will be useful for the other half in any case, so the Army may as well raise the Army to eight full battalions.  Under current plans, other ADF components are:

• RAAF Beyond F-35s: 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets and 12 EA-18G Growlers (electronic warfare; upgrades to 2030s); 12 P-8A Poseidons (maritime patrol; LRASM integration); 6 E-7A Wedgetails (AEW&C); 7 KC-30A tankers; 8 C-17A Globemasters and 10 C-130J Hercules (strategic/tactical airlift).

• RAN Beyond Listed: 2 Supply-class replenishment oilers (AORs); 6 Huon-class minehunters; 4 Bay-class landing ships (LSMs); MH-60R Seahawk helicopters (24; ASW).

• Joint/Strategic: Over-the-horizon radars (JORN); Loyal Wingman drones (MQ-28 Ghost Bat; 100+ planned); HIMARS land-based anti-ship missiles (PrSM/NSM integration).

In terms of preventing any potential enemy naval approach from the north, this portfolio of weapon systems, aided by the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN), is only sufficient to give early warning for Australia to coordinate with the U.S., notify allies in the region, and mount a first line of defence.  How long or effective would that be able to last is open to speculation.  There is only a 2-3-week buffer of oil reserve in the country.

As China expands its blue ocean navy in conjunction with its BRI, Australia’s defence would fall short in a matter of weeks.  Delays in getting AUKUS up to speed is a major concern in this picture.  Current plans place the first 2-3 purchased Virginia Class nuclear powered subs in the 2030s, with the balance of 5-6 to be built in Australia in the 2040s and the full 8-complement achieved by the mid-2050s.  This schedule is atrociously slow.  The move to establish missile production capacity in Australia is a welcome breakthrough.  This should intensify to matching that capacity with a defence shield against long range missiles including hypersonic ones.  And rather than placing such a shield on Australian territory, it would be more effective placing it further north, adding to the Second Island Chain net to ward off or shoot down any China sourced rocket attacks headed for Australia.

AUKUS

Australia cannot afford to be distracted from the AUKUS plan – it must have nuclear-powered submarines, preferably raised to at least 12 boats, preferably more, and the earlier the better.  Without a substantial submarine force, Australia is vulnerable.  The 12 x Barracuda fleet that was jettisoned had the right number for deployment in shifts.  Exchanging it for 8 Virginias is downsizing while upsizing is required.  The latter subs are superior to the French subs (due to Australia’s own decision to switch the Barracuda to diesel from an original nuclear-powered design), but we still need to raise the number to cover 2 continents and play a forward role with Allies.

A U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) report highlighted that China's shipbuilding capacity is about 230 times greater than that of the U.S.  The disparity contributes to China's large and growing navy, which now surpasses all others in terms of ship numbers.  The U.S. Navy, by comparison, has seen a decrease in its fleet size since the end of the Cold War.  The PLAN submarine fleet will likely be around 100 vessels by the time Australia receives its full complement of 8 new ones with current plans.  PLAN boats are of inferior quality to Western ones but this is not a sufficient weakness for exploit by Australia, which can only place ships in one place at any one time.  The one area of military capability that China still lacks is anti-submarine warfare.  Despite its apparent large fleet of 55-odd subs, 5 of which are nuclear powered, China is found wanting in submarine quality, quietness and range.  Australia can adopt the Offset Strategy that the U.S. had used successfully against the Soviet Union and which China has tried to emulate against the U.S. over the last decade.  With China closing the gap on quality of equipment in addition to its overwhelming quantitative advantage, it is more urgent for Australia to find the most efficient, least cost ways to procure and utilise leading edge technology and to maximise return on defence spending.  Anti-access, area-denial (A2/CE) strategy and tactics should be used to discourage PLAN access to Oceania, though we need a strong submarine fleet for this.

Drones

To monitor and disrupt an adversary’s excursions into the Southwest Pacific, Australia needs to have constant surveillance of naval movements and, when needed, carry out defensive and offensive operations.  This should include ability to work with U.S. fleets to strike at China’s assets in the SEAS and possibly further north to keep the PLAN busy away from Oceania.

This requires an additional platform for distance deployment that is numerous in operating units yet doesn’t compete with other main platforms in terms of budgets and human resources – the unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV).  The U.S. Navy has placed orders for Orcas, a top-range UUV with size (up to 30 metres and 6 tons), range and payload.  Australia is ordering Ghost Sharks, a boat about 1/3 the Orca’s size, designed for the USN and RAN.  These are competent UUVs capable of operating for 10 days at depth of 6km, though more endurance is needed for Australian maritime intelligence due to the large number of surface and undersea targets.  Distances in this regional theatre are not as vast as the Pacific or Atlantic theatre in its entirety.  But the region is busy with islands and peninsula-nation states such as Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines.  The Spratly rest 2500 km, and Shanghai 5000 km, from Darwin.  These distances are much less than the 8000 km gap between Shanghai and Hawaii.  Yet, the region is more complex to monitor.

Australia has great need for covert listening outposts in the SEAS and South-West Pacific chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Malacca.  This dilemma for China would not go away with the potential construction of a Thai (Kha) canal, should this project go ahead.  It would only move the chokepoint from south to north of Malaysia, by less than 1000 km.  Further, the parties are aware that a Kha canal would trigger India’s mobilisation of an island base on the Indian Ocean side opposite the mouth of the canal.  PLAN boats using the canal to cut through from the Gulf of Siam would be monitored directly by India.  This region is naturally of acute interest to Beijing and provides some leverage to Australia in dealing with China.  The chokepoint offers opportunity to Australia to produce materially useful intelligence on the location and movement of PLAN assets in the Indo-Pacific, which means on China’s economic and logistical endurance in a large, lengthy conflict.

Missile Mesh

Other than the thin line of anti-air defensive weapons carried in the thin line of surface warships, Australia has no capabilities in anti-missile defence of the scale and scope needed to protect the small number of cities where four-fifths of the total population congregate.  This is in stark contrast to Israel’s long established Iron Dome and the U.S.’s attempts at such under Reagan’s Star War initiative and the more recent Trump’s announcement of a nuclear shield against Russian and Chinese hypersonic ICBMs.  Israel’s Iron Dome has proved super valuable in the attacks and counterattacks between Israel and Muslim terrorist organisations (Hamas, Hezbollah) and states (Iran, Yemen).  Despite the Israeli record, and deployment of U.S. advanced anti-missile defence systems in Japan and South Korea, White does not see such a system as a priority for Australia considering the cost of deployment, low interdiction success rate and lack of high-value targets for Beijing to aim at given the significant cost of launching long-range ballistic missiles, the only type that could reach Australia.

However, our view is otherwise and there are several reasons for this.  First is that Australian targets are concentrated and few and of very high value.  There are only 7 cities, JORN and a few energy project sites such as the LNG platforms in the Northwest that hold strategic value for an adversary’s high-cost hypersonic weapons.  Damaging these targets will damage a very large part of Australia’s population and industry enabling centres.  Second, rapid advances in offence and defence missile technology have reduced the cost of countervailing precision missile system deployment.  Australia can take advantage of already developed U.S. and Israeli defence systems.  Third, these systems will increasingly be lower cost and more effective than the alternative of using Air or Naval force to counter any attacks.  Taiwan is looking at installing a T-Dome anti-missile defence system with the help of Japan and Israel.

In a report on Australia’s role in an Indo-Pacific war, Thomas Mahnken recommends turning Northern Australia into a stronghold with capacity to help Allies sustain a protracted war.  This stronghold could serve as a venue for friendly forces to train in peacetime, as the base from which they could deploy, and as a hub that would sustain them in wartime.  Such forces in northern Australia must be able to collect accurate intel for defence and sustain power in time of war.  Transforming northern Australia into an Indo-Pacific stronghold will require Australia to invest in creating an expanded and resilient defence infrastructure suited to a tailored long-range strike portfolio, and in enhancing Australia’s ability to sustain operations in a protracted conflict.  Such infrastructure would render a Chinese suppression campaign against Australian bases extremely difficult.  A robust basing infrastructure, combined with air and missile defence, would compound the costs Beijing would face conducting long-distance and lengthy campaigns.

Beyond this northern Australia infrastructure, it is imperative that Australia coordinate with the U.S. and Philippines to place and man air defence through Australian shield missile batteries at the forward bases in northern Philippines.  In terms of long-range air-to-ground strike against a peer adversary, the U.S. has shifted back to bomber-delivered mid- to long-range missiles, including hypersonic ones, and ICBMs rather than using such large aerial drones (UAV).  Existing bomber inventory can deliver bigger payload than drones at similar ranges.  Strategic bombers, especially the 100x stealth B-21s and inventory of B-2s, are said to be on semi-permanent rotation in the sky (Dynamic Force Employment) rather than being massed at large overseas military bases.  The bombers can be escorted by manned and unmanned fighters and refuelled mid-air.  The USAF and Israeli Airforce use F-15EX, which are fighters and also light bombers following the stealth fighters F-22 and F-35 (and unmanned fighters like the F-47B) path-clearing sorties.  Having withdrawn from the mid-range missile treaty with Russia, the U.S. is developing and fielding large numbers of 500-2000 km missiles.  These are suitable for its Army and Marines units operating in littoral Northeast and Southeast Asia that is very different from the empty plains of Europe and deserts of the Middle East.  As all the maritime goods will still go through the SEAS, this would be intercepted heavily, with the PLAN not capable of countering any U.S. attempt at blocking the choke points in a blockade against China.  Mobile U.S. missile batteries are stationed across the Philippines so China’s military bases in the SEAS would become sitting ducks, like a dotted Maginot Line.  The Philippines bases can also act as a forward missile defence dome for Guam and Australia, intercepting PLA Rocket Force missiles from China targeting either.   

To complement Naval force structure and short-medium range offensive air force using F-35s, Australia is manufacturing the Ghost Bat, a drone jet with 3000+ km range with an electronic payload to work in swarm with the F-35s.  The Ghost Bat is a top-end Loyal Wingman type with possibility to be armed with 2 missiles each.  While F-35s are limited to reaching surface targets up to 1500 kms including their standard combat range without aerial refuelling, the Ghost Bats can fly all the way to near Singapore and launch missiles to reach anywhere in the SEAS up to China’s south coast.  They are relatively low cost compared to an F-35 and designed for attrition missions if required. With aerial refuelling, the Ghost Bats can be a significant force multiplier.  The United States no longer maintains permanent military bases in the Philippines following the 1991 closure of major installations like Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. Instead, under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) – signed in 2014 and expanded in 2023 – U.S. forces gain rotational access to Philippine military facilities.  This allows for temporary deployments, joint exercises, prepositioned equipment, and humanitarian operations, without permanent U.S. garrisons.  Northern Luzon (the northern part of the island, including provinces like Cagayan, Isabela, and Pampanga) hosts several key EDCA sites due to their strategic proximity to Taiwan (300 – 500 km) and the SEAS.  These enhance U.S.-Philippine interoperability amid regional tensions with China.  As of October 2025, there are 9 total EDCA sites nationwide, with 5 in Luzon (4 northern/central).  Australia should seek participation in these facilities.

The U.S. was considering Agile Combat Employment (ACE) doctrine but this concept, shifting U.S. forces among small, vulnerable airfields to avoid asset concentrations where Chinese missiles could target, only works if the U.S. can materially degrade China’s command and control (C2) and regional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.  Otherwise, China would likely locate and be able to strike U.S. forces after each move.  In peace time, degrading ISR and C2 may be considered escalatory.  It is better for the U.S. to harden regional air bases – by building large numbers of hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) at airfields across the region – and prioritise jamming to blunt any Chinese missile attack.  This will deny China access capabilities while reducing the need for the U.S. to pre-emptively attack Beijing’s ISR and C2.  Estimated costs for hardened shelters capable of withstanding mass Chinese missiles range USD4.5-6m each (sized for 2 jet fighters), a relatively small investment per thousand shelters compared to the cost of aircraft and/or regularly moving airbases.  Further, the U.S. has advantages in choosing to fix the airbases but not the retaliatory missiles.  HIMARs and other attack missile batteries can still be moved around the Philippines and Japan with ease to deliver mass attacks on the limited number of fixed Chinese airfields and naval bases in the SEAS and those within reach on the Chinese mainland.  With the U.S. now returning to nuclear weapons testing, the U.S.-China nuclear warhead gap will be maintained, making a Chinese decision to go nuclear in any conflict not involving U.S. troops on the mainland impossible to be made.

If a nuclear exchange is out of the question, any conventional war will require China to have significantly more air, sea and land force multipliers than what it has in the foreseeable future to take Taiwan by force.  The PLA will need outright air superiority to protect the highly vulnerable amphibious and airlifted troops in transit to the island, regardless of the scale of such logistics (eg, by China acquiring more advanced airlift and amphibious capabilities from Russia).  Air superiority will also be required for any sea blockade, which will quickly become a two-way campaign, with the U.S. and Allies laying siege to China completely from land route accesses from the West, and sea accesses from the Indian Ocean and west Pacific.   While China claims 800 airbases on the mainland that are within un-refuelled jetfighters’ range from Taiwan, PLAAF planes will be subject to U.S. sweep-strike tactics, which involve dozens of U.S. fighters converging on Taiwan on a frequent basis to shoot down or drive off the Chinese aircraft on patrol and target PLAN ships and then withdraw before Chinese reinforcements arrived from mainland bases.  Doing so will let the USAF hold the initiative on time and scale of attacks.

The Taiwan stand-off is predicated on the difficulties China faces in selecting an annexation strategy since none would leave China better off.  Even an arms-length missile destruction or blockade using PLA Rocket Force’s vast array and inventory of missiles can run the risk of turning China itself into flood zones.  The temptation for China to just level Taiwan’s TSMC plant and surrounding zones can be irresistible.  If Beijing believes it will never catch up with TSMC technology despite the fortune it is sending into SMIC and the semiconductor industry, it might choose the denial route like a rejected and dejected lover.  If I can’t have you, neither shall he!  But Taiwan has insinuated that such thought would be suicidal.  China’s tens of thousands of dams large and small that dot the country represents an open weakness.  Dams such as the Three Gorges are open to U.S. or possibly Taiwanese destruction by long-range sea or air missiles.  The option of massive ordnances delivered by U.S. stealth bombers should be sufficient to deter any rash decision by Beijing to go to war with the U.S.   There is no guarantee that China would be able to detect let alone shoot down the more advanced B-21s, which will be escorted by stealth fighters F-22s and F-35s.  Such aerial assaults, combined with the latest Tomahawk cruise missiles, are not easily repelled when push comes to shove.  The Tomahawk Block V and Block Vb variants have a maximum range of 1600-1800 kms. This is an improvement over earlier Block IV models due to enhanced fuel efficiency, navigation upgrades, and communications systems that allow for more efficient flight paths.  While subsonic, these are terrain hugging missiles that are almost undetectable by radars over distances.  Launched from surface ships or submarines or land platforms, they have a strong history of causing significant damage to enemy locations onshore.  The Tomahawk was originally designed to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, including tactical (low-yield) nuclear options like the W80 (5-200 kt yield) in its TLAM-N variant.  However, modern Tomahawks do not carry nuclear warheads and are not certified for them to comply with arms control policies (INF Treaty) and U.S. strategic shifts toward conventional precision strikes.  There were discussions in 2017-18 about potentially reintroducing nuclear Tomahawks for deterrence against Russia but this did not lead to implementation.  Taiwan does not have Block V or Block Vb Tomahawk missiles as U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are defensive systems like Harpoon anti-ship missiles, HIMARS rocket systems, NASAMS air defence, and various jet fighter components and radars.  But Taiwan relies on indigenous equivalents, such as the Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack cruise missile (range 600-2000 kms, similar in role to Tomahawks) and has not pursued U.S. offensive standoff weapons like Tomahawks due to political sensitivities with China and a focus on asymmetric defences.  The unspoken, however, is that the Hsiung Feng IIE can reach the Three Gorges Dam.

Japan, on the other hand, is acquiring Tomahawks through a USD1.7-2.35 billion U.S. foreign military sales deal signed in January 2024 for 400 missiles: 200 Block IV (land-attack) and 200 Block V (upgraded land-attack with enhanced navigation and targeting).  Deliveries are scheduled for Japan’s fiscal years 2025-27 (Ap 2025-Mar 2028), with initial Block V units expected in early 2025 and full integration on Aegis destroyers (eg, Kongo-class like JS Chokai, which began U.S.-based modifications in Sept 2025) by 2026-27.  Japan’s Block V acquisition serves as an entry point for subvariants, but the deal specifies standard Block V (not explicitly Va maritime strike or Vb multi-effects warhead).  Block Va (anti-ship) and Vb (hardened-target penetration) are U.S. options, and Japan could pursue upgrades later for its fleet, but current contracts focus on land-attack roles to bridge to indigenous missiles like the extended-range Type 12.  Training with U.S. Navy personnel started in Mar 2024, and live-fire tests are planned for 2026.  This acquisition enhances Japan’s counterstrike capabilities around Taiwan to complement Japan’s recent indication that an attack on Taiwan would bring in Japan.

For Australia, a far-ranging anti-missile net should be strung across the northern hemisphere far away from the Australian mainland, if possible, with backup from another onshore layer.  This is to deter and pre-empt ICBM attacks from China from its mainland platforms and their surrounds.  This missile mesh (Miss-Mesh) should be the first line of defence and aligned with the First and Second Island Chains.  Any attack from outside this confine, such as from the PLAN submarines, would be countered by Australia’s conventional air, naval and land forces.

The United States maintains a layered Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) architecture, managed primarily by the Missile Defence Agency (MDA) and the U.S. Army, designed to counter threats from short-range rockets to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).  These systems integrate radars, sensors, command-and-control networks, and interceptors for detection, tracking, and destruction.  These are the best systems in terms of operational maturity, proven effectiveness in tests/combat, deployment scale, and versatility against evolving threats like hypersonic missiles and drones.

• Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3):  A mobile, ground-based system excelling in terminal-phase intercepts of short- to medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs/MRBMs), cruise missiles, and aircraft. It uses hit-to-kill interceptors and has a strong combat record, notably in Ukraine (intercepting Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missiles) and Saudi Arabia against Houthi drones.  Deployed globally with over 1,000 launchers, it’s highly reliable (90%+ success in recent tests) but limited to 20-35 km altitude and 160 km range.  Cost per interceptor: $4-6 million.

• Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD):  A mobile, ground-based system for endo- and exo-atmospheric intercepts of SRBMs, MRBMs, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) at high altitudes (up to 150 km).  It uses kinetic kill vehicles and protects areas up to 200 km in radius.  Proven in tests (100% success rate in 16 intercepts) and deployed in South Korea, Guam, and the Middle East, its integrated AN/TPY-2 radars for early warning are of top value.  Cost per battery: $1 billion.

• Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD):  A sea- and land-based (Aegis Ashore) system using SM-3 interceptors for midcourse intercepts of MRBMs and IRBMs, plus SM-6 for terminal defence.  Deployed on 50 U.S. Navy destroyers/cruisers and sites in Romania/Poland, it demonstrated real-world success in April 2024 by intercepting Iranian missiles targeting Israel.  Versatile against hypersonics and aircraft, it has a range of up to 2,500 km.  Cost per SM-3: $20 million.

• Ground-Based Midcourse Defence (GMD):  The cornerstone for U.S. homeland defence against long-range threats, these systems are interconnected via the Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) network, with upgrades like the Long-Range Discriminating Radar (LRDR) in Alaska (fully operational by late 2025) enhancing decoy discrimination.  Emerging tech, such as hypersonic defences via Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), is in testing but not yet deployed.

ICBMs (range >5,500 km) travel through space in a midcourse phase, reaching speeds of Mach 20+ and deploying decoys, making intercepts challenging.  U.S. systems are optimised for “limited” attacks (eg, from rogue states like North Korea), not massive salvos from Russia/China.  Only two are certified for ICBM intercepts as of 2025:

• Ground-Based Midcourse Defence (GMD):  The primary homeland system, using 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) at Fort Greely, Alaska (40), and Vandenberg Space Force Base, California (4).  It employs exo-atmospheric kill vehicles to collide with warheads in space during midcourse (outside atmosphere).  Designed for 5-10 incoming ICBMs, it has a 56% single-shot success rate (97% with four shots) in tests, though critics note scripted conditions inflate this.  Upgrades include Redesigned Kill Vehicles (RKV) debuting in 2025 for better decoy handling.  Limitations: Vulnerable to saturation attacks; no boost-phase intercept capability.  Cost per GBI: $75 million.

• Aegis BMD with SM-3 Block IIA:  Ship- or land-launched, this variant (tested successfully against ICBM-class targets in 2020) can perform midcourse intercepts from the Pacific/Atlantic. It adds flexible positioning via Navy fleets, complementing GMD. Success rate: High in tests (85%), but unproven in combat against ICBMs.  Deployed on 40+ ships; cost per missile: $20-25 million.

No U.S. system guarantees 100% defence against a full-scale ICBM barrage (eg, Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles – or MIRV – warheads), as adversaries can overwhelm with decoys/numbers.  Boost-phase interceptions (destroying missiles during launch) are in R&D but face geographic/political hurdles.  Terminal-phase systems like PAC-3/THAAD cannot handle ICBM speeds or re-entry heat.  But inspired by Israel’s Iron Dome (a short-range, ground-based system intercepting rockets/drones over 70 km with 90% success), President Trump’s “Golden Dome” is a far more ambitious, nationwide (and potentially hemispheric) shield announced via executive order on 27 Jan 2025, and detailed on 20 May.  Unlike Iron Dome’s focus on tactical threats in a small area (Israel, 22,000 km²), Golden Dome aims to protect the continental U.S. (9.8 million km², 450 times larger) from advanced threats: ICBMs, hypersonics, cruise missiles, drones, and space-launched weapons.  Australia should take part in this development to confirm feasibility if for nothing else.  The records in the last five years, however, show very encouraging results that U.S. technology is capable of intercepting current long-range missiles from Russia and China.

Golden Dome’s key features:

• Scope: Multi-layered, space-based “overlayer” with thousands of networked satellites/interceptors (eg, kinetic “Brilliant Pebbles”-style swarms) for global coverage, plus ground/sea enhancements.  Includes sensors for early warning, directed-energy weapons (lasers/microwaves like Israel’s Iron Beam), and AI-driven battle management.

• Inspiration and Differences: Modelled conceptually on Israel’s layered defences (Iron Dome for short-range, David’s Sling/Arrow for longer) but scaled for strategic threats. It revives Reagan’s 1980s Strategic Defence Initiative (“Star Wars”) with modern tech like SpaceX’s Starlink for rapid deployment.

• Timeline and Leadership: Claimed completion by end 2029, led by Space Force Gen. Michael Guetlein.  Initial funding: $25 billion in FY2026 (2.5% of $1 trillion defence budget), with prototypes in 3 years.

• Cost: Officially $175 billion, with estimates of $500+ billion over decades due to scale, R&D, and maintenance.  Builds on existing GMD/Aegis ($400 billion since the 1950s).

• Allies: Canada is invited to join (for $61 billion or “annexation” quip).  Criticised by China as space-militarising but proponents (Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025) see it as deterrence.

Golden Dome will integrate/expand current systems like GMD, potentially adding offensive satellite capabilities.  As of Nov 2025, it’s in design phase with contractors (Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, SpaceX) bidding; it has congressional support via the Iron Dome Act.  Feasibility debates rage: Achievable with U.S. tech edge, but risks escalation with peers like Russia’s A-135 or China’s HQ-19.

A Centre for Strategic and International Studies report, Mesh Sensing for Air and Missile Defence - A Vision for Passive, Proliferated Sensor Networks highlights the era of massed air and missile threats and identifies the need for thickets of high and low sensors to better survive the environment.  However, to date, the air and missile defence force structure has remained reliant on handfuls of exquisite, large-signature surface-based radars.  The report goes on to describe how to realise a proliferated, resilient surface-based sensor architecture, with model-based analysis of asset coverage, engagement geometry, network bandwidth, and other factors. By combining meshed passive sensors with active radar, defenders could better cover difficult regions, conserve radar resources, and discriminate false targets from real ones.  The U.S. sensor procurement programs since 2009 include:

• Ballistic Missile Defence Radars RDT&E

• BMD European Midcourse Radar RDT&E

• BMDS AN/TPY-2 Radars Procurement

• Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) RDT&E

• Homeland Defence Radar – Hawaii (HDR-H) RDT&E

• Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) RDT&E

• Lower Tier Missile Defence (LTMD) Sensor Procurement

• Over the Horizon Backscatter Radar RDT&E

• Pacific Discrimination Radar RDT&E

• Radar Spares Procurement

• Sentinel Mods Procurement

• Wide Area Surveillance RDT&E and Procurement

Today’s radars are highly capable in air defence as they can resolve the position, velocity, and direction of a threat at any time and in all weathers.  They can identify friends and foes, and complete interceptions.  But they are also single points of failure, emitting energy that can be detected from long distance, sometimes sealing their own fate.

Passive sensors, including electro-optical/ infrared (EO/IR), acoustic, and radiofrequency sensors, have lacked the range and resolution of traditional air defence radars yet, when combined in a mesh with modern machine learning systems, they hold considerable promise for tracking targets and building a more capable and resilient defence.  As radars radiate energy to illuminate targets and detect them, this required energy supply increasing with distance for the radiofrequency beam to shine even further, larger antennas, or multiples more energy, are needed the further the threat.  By contrast, EO/IR, acoustic, and passive radiofrequency sensors simply collect the energy emitted from the threat objects themselves.  EO/IR represents one type of passive sensing.  Another type is Ukraine’s Sky Fortress, which consists of acoustic sensors that listen for sound energy.  Their microphones and the passive radio receivers of the U.S. Army’s Long Range Persistent Surveillance (ALPS) system don’t emit energy.  They are cheap to deploy – Ukraine’s microphones in the 270-sensor Zvook network cost approximately $500 each, which consists of a small microphone, a plastic acoustic mirror and support electronics.  As of 2024, the country’s Sky Fortress has deployed 12,500 Zvooks at a total cost of <USD5 million, covering 80% of the territory.  A characteristic of the EO/IR systems is that their detection range is maximised in the vertical space directly above them, which complements well all existing radar systems that detect threats in a dome shape angle.  If not done already, Australia should option the use of EO/IR capabilities to complement JORN.

Most defence items above are new capabilities that require mass training of a workforce.  Our emphases above will fulfil the needs as identified in the Mahnken report.